Iacampo Charged Under Ohio Law Found Unconstitutional in 2016
In a startling change of events, prosecutors have asked the court to dismiss a sexual battery charge against a Chester Township police officer accused of having sexual contact with a teenager while on duty because the state law making it a felony for a peace officer to have sex with a minor more than two years younger than the officer was ruled unconstitutional in 2016.
In a startling change of events, prosecutors have asked the court to dismiss a sexual battery charge against a Chester Township police officer accused of having sexual contact with a teenager while on duty because the state law making it a felony for a peace officer to have sex with a minor more than two years younger than the officer was ruled unconstitutional in 2016.
On Monday, Lake County Prosecutor Charles E. Coulson, who Geauga County Common Pleas Court Judge Carolyn Paschke had appointed as special prosecutor in the case, filed a motion to dismiss the case against Chester Township police officer Nicholas J. Iacampo, 29, of Painesville, pending further investigation.
“The reason for said request is that the case cannot be prosecuted as charged,” Coulson wrote in his two-page motion.
“Defendant is presently charged with sexual battery, a felony of the third degree, in violation of Ohio Revised Code 2907.03(A)(13). In 2016, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that R.C. 2907.03(A)(13) is unconstitutional on its face. State v. Mole, 149 Ohio St.3d 215, 74 N.E.3d 368 (2016),” Coulson explained. “Despite the ruling of the Ohio Supreme Court, R.C. 2907.03(A)(13) remains in the Ohio Revised Code and the Ohio Legislature has not amended, corrected or otherwise appealed subsection (A)(13). Because R.C. 2907.03(A)(13) is unconstitutional, this case cannot proceed against defendant as presently charged. Therefore, the state moves this honorable court to enter a nolle prosequi on the above-captioned case, pending further investigation.”
Retired Wayne County Court of Common Pleas Judge Mark Wiest, who is presiding over the case, scheduled the motion for oral hearing at 10 a.m. Aug. 18, the original date and time set for Iacampo’s preliminary hearing, according to the Chardon Municipal Court docket.
When reached for comment, Iacampo’s attorney Ian Friedman told the Geauga County Maple Leaf, “We respect the legal process and have no further comment at this time other than to say that we will appear in court on Friday pursuant to the Judge Wiest’s order.”
Iacampo was arrested the evening of Aug. 6, after the Geauga County Sheriff’s Office received a report involving serious allegations against a Chester Township police officer.
“These allegations involved a teenage complainant while the officer was on duty,” Chester Township Police Chief Craig Young said in an Aug. 7 press release.
The sheriff’s office contacted Young’s department, triggering an immediate investigation. In collaboration with Geauga County Prosecutor Jim Flaiz, Young said the Chester Township Police Department requested assistance from the Lake County Sheriff’s Office to conduct a third-party investigation.
That investigation, conducted by a Lake County sheriff’s detective, found Iacampo engaged in sexual conduct with a minor who at the time of the incident was 16 years of age.
The conduct allegedly took place in the parking lot of the Church of the Blessed Hope on Wilson Mills Road in Chester Township, according to law enforcement sources.
“Furthermore, the accused admitted to the offense while speaking with detectives,” the detective stated in a complaint filed with the court.
The complaint against Iacampo cites a violation of Ohio Revised Code section 2907.03, which states, in part, that no person shall engage in sexual conduct with another if “the other person is a minor, the offender is a peace officer and the offender is more than two years older than the other person.”
Iacampo, who has been placed under immediate administrative leave following his Aug. 6 arrest, had been released from the Lake County jail after posting bond.
State v. Mole
In a 4-3 decision in “State v. Mole,” the Supreme Court of Ohio found a provision in Ohio’s sexual battery statute applying to peace officers — ORC section 2907.03 — violates the equal protection clauses of the Ohio and U.S. constitutions. Writing for the majority, then Chief Justice Maureen O’Connor noted other provisions of the sexual battery statute, such as those that apply to a teacher, a cleric or a mental health provider, require an occupational relationship with the minor, while the peace officer provision applies even when there is no occupation-based relationship between the peace officer and the victim.
The supreme court affirmed the decision of the Eighth District Court of Appeals, which found the conviction of Waite Hill police officer Matthew Mole unconstitutional and overturned his two-year prison sentence.
In separate dissenting opinions, Justices Sharon L. Kennedy and Judith L. French wrote the General Assembly only had to have a rational basis for establishing the prohibition and that holding peace officers to a higher standard of conduct is enough justification to pass constitutional muster.
In the Mole case, Mole first encountered a minor identified in court documents as J.S. when J.S. initiated a conversation with Mole through a mobile phone dating application. J.S. claimed to be 18 and a high school senior, but was 14 at the time. Mole was 35.
Mole visited J.S. at the teen’s family’s home at 3 a.m. J.S. led Mole to an unlit sunroom at the back of the house where they engaged in sexual activity. Soon thereafter, they were discovered by J.S.’s mother, and Mole then first learned J.S. was 14.
It is undisputed that Mole never told J.S. that he was a peace officer, and that J.S. did not know that Mole was a peace officer, according to court documents.
The jury deadlocked on an unlawful sexual conduct charge against Mole, but found him guilty of sexual battery under ORC section 2907.03.
In her majority opinion, O’Connor explained lawmakers have a right to classify groups of individuals and set different standards of treatment for those classes, but the constitution only permits those classifications if there are legitimate reasons for them.
The court did agree peace officers occupy a unique position of public trust that calls for special standards and penalties in certain circumstances.
“But we do not agree that a person’s status as a peace officer justifies the imposition of different sexual-conduct standards for peace officers in circumstances in which the officer’s status is irrelevant,” O’Connor wrote. “The sexual conduct at issue here was unrelated to Mole’s professional status. And the jury’s failure to convict him of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor makes clear that, but for his status as a peace officer, Mole would not be subject to criminal liability for the sexual conduct at issue in this case.”
O’Connor reiterated peace officers must accept certain burdens as part of their employment in order to maintain the honor and privilege of being peace officers and to foster public trust.
“They do not lose all of their rights as ordinary citizens, including their constitutional right to be treated equally under the criminal law, simply because they have chosen the profession of peace officer,” she wrote.
This breaking news story will be updated and more details will be published as they become available.
