Allen Oakwood Correctional Institution Escape Investigation Report (With Video)
Below is a summary of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation & Correction investigation report following the escape of convicted Chardon Schools shooter T.J. Lane and two other inmates from the Allen Oakwood Correction Institution.
Below is a link to security camera footage of the escape. Certain portions of video footage are being withheld pursuant to ORC 5120.21(D)(1-2) due to institutional security features being visible and the positioning of the cameras revealing the internal layout of the compound, according to JoEllen Smith of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation & Correction.
http://www.drc.ohio.gov/drcvideo/drcvid2.html
Background
On Thursday, September 11, 2014, inmates Lindsey Bruce (A508‐485), Thomas Lane III (A640‐654) and Clifford Opperud (A579‐262) escaped from the Oakwood unit of the Allen Oakwood Correctional Institution (AOCI) at 7:38 p.m.
All three inmates were classified as protective control (PC), a housing assignment designed for inmates of all security levels who require separation from the general population for their own safety.
The inmates fashioned a 13 1⁄2 foot ladder over the course of several months from materials stored in a maintenance access area, similar to a crawl space. This area is 38 inches high at its narrowest height, and is located just inside the entrance of the west wing recreation yard of the Oakwood unit. The door to the maintenance access area was secured with a padlock, which the inmates were able to breach.
The inmates utilized the ladder during the evening recreation period to access the roof of the administration building, which is located at the entrance of the facility. Once on top of the administration building, the three inmates jumped approximately 15 feet off the front of the building and escaped through a soybean field directly north of the prison and proceeded north across Bluelick Road.
Prison security systems were immediately activated, allowing for an immediate response from prison officials. All three were apprehended within hours.
Two Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (DRC) Correction Officers apprehended the first inmate, Lindsey Bruce, nine minutes after the escape at 7:47 p.m. on prison property.
Thomas Lane III was apprehended in a wooded area near the prison at 1:20 a.m. by the Ohio State Highway Patrol’s Special Response Team. An Ohio State Highway Patrol canine led officers to the inmate’s location.
Clifford Opperud was captured at 4:22 a.m. by the task force after a canine led law enforcement to him. He was apprehended hiding under a boat on a private residence, north of Bluelick Road.
All three inmates surrendered without incident due to the quick and professional assistance from the Allen County Sheriff’s Office, City of Lima Police Department, the Ohio State Highway Patrol, DRC’s Special Tactics and Response Teams (STAR) and regional Special Response Teams.
After being apprehended, one of the escapees attributed the rapid law enforcement response and quick establishment of a secure perimeter as the reason he was unable to move any further.
All three inmates were subsequently transferred by the DRC STAR team to the Ohio State Penitentiary in Youngstown, the state’s highest security facility.
AOCI consists of the Oakwood Correctional Facility and Allen Correctional Institution, previously two separate prisons that merged in 2011 to achieve operational efficiency. Both are located on the same grounds as Lima Correctional Institution, which closed in 2004.
The overall population at AOCI is 1,606. The population at the Oakwood unit is 240, including 65 protective control inmates. The Oakwood unit houses a majority of Ohio’s protective control offenders.
Incident Investigations
An internal investigation immediately commenced to review the incident and identify factors which possibly contributed to the escape. In addition, due to the significance of this incident, Director Gary Mohr requested an independent review by the Association of State Correctional Administrators (ASCA), a national group of corrections experts.
From September 22‐26, 2014, four ASCA representatives were in Ohio reviewing DRC’s classification system (a numerical system ranging from level 1 representing minimum security to level 5 representing administrative maximum security), including initial security designation and the security review process, protective control placement and supervision, and the operational and security features of the Oakwood unit.
Both the internal investigative report and the ASCA report are being shared with DRC facility wardens and select operational staff. Both reports, however, contain detailed information about security operations at AOCI and are considered confidential.
This summary was prepared to share key findings and common themes of both reviews, as well as operational changes that have already been implemented or that will take place in the future.
Both reviews found concerns in the areas of key and lock control, security features, inmate access to restricted areas, and the overall leadership and mission of the Oakwood unit.
Key Investigative Findings
The following are critical findings of the internal and external reviews:
1) Key and Lock Control: The three inmates were able to access the maintenance area over the course of several months to construct a ladder. On June 9, 2013, a Correction Officer at AOCI wrote an incident report describing discarded wooden cabinets containing old flashlights and batteries found in the maintenance access area during a security check in the Oakwood unit. The administrative actions that occurred following the completion and submission of the incident report are a key part of an ongoing evaluation of employee conduct. Upon the conclusion of that evaluation, appropriate corrective actions will occur.
Completed Actions: The following actions have been completed in the area of key and lock control:
• Padlocks located in critical areas of the type and kind the inmates were able to successfully breach have been replaced with higher security locks.
• The maintenance access area is now properly secured and will be properly inspected as an unoccupied space in accordance with DRC policy.
Ongoing Actions: A key and lock assessment is underway. Issues of noncompliance with DRC key and lock control procedures are being considered for further corrective action.
2) Security Elements: During both the internal and external assessments, a security camera at the Oakwood Unit was found inoperable due to a previous lightning strike. Some perimeter lighting was also found to be in need of repair or replacement. Completed Actions: The following actions have been completed in the area of security elements:
• A private contractor was onsite to assess the damage caused by a lightning strike to the camera and camera lines.
• All perimeter lights have been fixed.
• Additional razor ribbon was immediately added to top of the administration building and other areas at the Oakwood unit.
• Perimeter fence alarm sensitivity level was heightened.
• A team of DRC staff conducted a security assessment of the Oakwood unit, and a detailed plan of action to improve security has been developed.
Ongoing Actions: Additional security enhancements are ongoing as identified by the security assessment. Prior to the September 11, 2014 incident, the Oakwood unit at AOCI was undergoing perimeter security enhancements, which included detaching the security perimeter from the adjacent closed Lima Correctional Institution in order to narrow the perimeter specifically around the Oakwood unit. This is an ongoing project.
3) Inmate Access: The inmates had unimpeded access to the maintenance access area on their way to and from the recreation yard and were able to breach the lock to enter the area. The fact that the inmates had access to this area is a key part of an ongoing evaluation of employee conduct surrounding the escape. Upon the conclusion of that evaluation, appropriate corrective actions will occur.
Completed Actions: The following actions have been completed in the area of inmate access:
• Immediately following the escape, the Oakwood unit was placed in a modified lockdown status to evaluate operational procedures and identify the need for immediate actions as it relates to inmate accountability.
• The recreation yard where the escape occurred was immediately closed and remains An alternate recreation yard is being used for the current population.
• The staffing plan for the Oakwood unit has been modified to ensure increased supervision during inmate recreation time. Ongoing Actions: Procedural security guidelines are being evaluated and reinforced regularly.
4) Overall Mission of the Oakwood Unit at the Allen Oakwood Correctional Institution: Both DRC’s internal review and the ASCA team’s report noted concerns with the housing of PC inmates, including all 4 security levels, within the Oakwood unit.
Completed Actions:
• Plans were underway before the escape to relocate high security (level 4) PC inmates from the Oakwood unit to other prisons. All level 4 inmates have been moved from the Oakwood unit, several of which were moved before the escape. Level 3 PC inmates have been transferred to other facilities.
Ongoing Actions: As a result of the escape, DRC is actively conducting an assessment of the PC population, as well as the general mission of the Oakwood unit at the Allen Oakwood Correctional Institution, to determine if any additional operational changes will be made. Final decisions regarding the placement of lower security (levels 1 and 2) PC inmates are expected to be made in the first quarter of 2015.
5) Facility Leadership and Culture: The ASCA review found staff at the Oakwood unit are very professional and experienced, but lack clarity about leadership at the Oakwood unit and its role within the overall mission of AOCI. The ASCA report recommended the need for a higher level of management to have increased presence at the Oakwood unit.
Completed Actions:
• Since the escape, there has been increased presence of DRC and AOCI executive staff at the Oakwood unit on a regular basis.
• Because of the challenges presented and still existing from the 2011 consolidation, DRC scheduled a cultural assessment of the entire AOCI complex. This assessment was requested before the escape occurred and is scheduled for the second week of December. A cultural assessment is a tool that DRC routinely uses to diagnose the current organizational culture at a particular facility. The ultimate goal is to lay a foundation for a cultural change process specific to the facility’s needs.
• At the Director’s request, the Warden has accepted a position at the Operation Support Center as a Regional Recovery Services Supervisor, and the Deputy Warden of Operations has been demoted to an Inspector at AOCI.
Ongoing Actions: Upon the conclusion of the Oakwood mission assessment, DRC is committed to providing an appropriate level of administrative oversight. DRC continues to evaluate the findings of the internal investigation to determine what additional corrective actions may result. Those employees whose actions or inactions may have contributed to the escape of Lane, Bruce, and Opperud will be held accountable and will face appropriate corrective measures.
Closing
The Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction takes very seriously its responsibility of operating safe and secure prisons. DRC understands and appreciates that when an inmate escapes from prison it is very traumatic for the victims of crime and impacted communities. Through both an internal and external review, all areas of concern have been, and will be, thoroughly addressed to ensure the safety and security of our staff, communities and inmate population, and to prevent this type of incident from happening in the future.
DRC would like to extend its appreciation to the many agencies that assisted to quickly apprehend the three inmates, including the Ohio State Highway Patrol, Allen County Sheriff’s Office, and the City of Lima Police Department.
